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Abstract
There is a recent trend toward rule-based authoriza-
tion systems to achieve flexible security policies. Also,
new sensing technologies in pervasive computing make
it possible to define context-sensitive rules, such as “al-
low database access only to staff who are currently lo-
cated in the main office.” However, these rules, or the
facts that are needed to verify authority, often involve
sensitive context information. This paper presents a se-
cure context-sensitive authorization system that protects
confidential information in facts or rules. Furthermore,
our system allows multiple hosts in a distributed envi-
ronment to perform the evaluation of an authorization
query in a collaborative way; we do not need a univer-
sally trusted central host that maintains all the context
information. The core of our approach is to decompose
a proof for making an authorization decision into a set
of sub-proofs produced on multiple different hosts, while
preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of
the mutually untrusted principals operating these hosts.
1 Introduction
Pervasive computing leads to an increased integration
between the real world and the computational world.
Many such applications adapt to the user’s context, that
is, the user’s situation and environment. We consider a
class of applications that wish to consider a user’s con-
text when deciding whether to authorize a user’s access
to important physical or information resources. Such
a context-sensitive authorization scheme is necessary
when a mobile user moves across multiple administra-
tive domains where they are not registered in advance.
Also, users interacting with their environment need a
non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues about
their context may be useful input into authorization poli-
cies for these resources.
There are several rule-based authorization sys-
tems [1, 2, 5, 11] that allow a resource owner or a man-
ager to define authorization rules that refer to the context
of the requester. These existing context-sensitive autho-
rization systems have a central server that collects con-
text information, and evaluates policies to make autho-
rization decisions on behalf of a resource owner. A cen-
tralized solution assumes that all resource owners trust
the server to make correct decisions, and all users trust
the server not to disclose private context information.
In many realistic applications of pervasive computing,
however, the resources, users, and sources of context in-
formation are inherently distributed among many orga-
nizations that do not necessarily trust each other. Re-
source owners may not trust the integrity of context in-
formation produced by another domain, and context sen-
sors may not trust others with the confidentiality of data
they provide about users.
We propose a secure, distributed, context-sensitive
rule-based authorization system. When a client requests
access to a resource, the resource owner constructs a
logical statement (query) that, if proven TRUE, indi-
cates that access may be granted; otherwise access is
denied. Although the resource’s host has a knowledge
base containing rules that represent authorization poli-
cies and facts about the users, it may not have all of the
necessary information and thus collaborates with other
hosts to attempt to construct a proof for the query. Thus,
rather than depending on a central trusted server (Fig-
ure1a), we decompose a proof into sub-proofs produced
by multiple hosts (Figure1b). This collaboration is only
possible if the querier can trust the integrity of other
hosts (to provide correct facts and to properly evaluate
rules) and if the other hosts can trust the querier with
confidential facts. We assume that these trust relation-
ships are defined byprincipals, each of which represents
a specific user or organization, and that each host is as-
sociated with one principal (e.g., the owner of a PDA, or
the manager of a server).
Our approach provides several benefits:
Confidentiality: Information used for making an au-
thorization decision is protected according to
access-control policies defined by the owner of that
information.
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Figure 1. Decentralized evaluation of an
authorization query. The proof of a query
is decomposed into sub-proofs and pro-
duced on distributed multiple hosts. On
the left, Host A generates a whole proof
on a centralized server. On the right, Host
A, B, and C produce only a subtree of the
proof.
Integrity: Proofs are evaluated by principals (hosts)
that are trusted by the queriers.
Scalability: By distributing the knowledge base and
proof construction we off-load work from a re-
source that may have limited processing or com-
munication capability.
In the following sections, we introduce our authoriza-
tion rule language and how this language can define in-
tegrity and confidentiality policies. Section4 describes
our authorization system for the simpler case, where
policies apply only to facts. We describe our system ar-
chitecture and introduce the concept of distributed pro-
cessing for an authorization query. We next describe the
enforcement mechanism for confidentiality policies and
the algorithm for constructing a proof in a distributed
way. In Section5, we extend our system to allow poli-
cies about rules. We discuss related work in Section6.
Section7 covers the security assurance and policy issues
in our system. Section8 describes our current status and
future work, and Section9 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we describe our language for defin-
ing authorization policies and introduce the concept of
a proof tree, which is constructed when evaluating an
authorization query.
2.1 Authorization rule language
In rule-based authorization systems, authorization
policies are represented as logical expressions. We ex-
press access-control policies with Horn clauses since
they are expressive enough to support the rules in ex-
isting rule-based authorization systems [1, 2, 5]. We
do not use a general first-order logic, which is not de-
cidable in general. The syntax of a Horn clause is
b ← a1 ∧ a2 . . . ∧ an , which says that simple state-
ments calledatomsa1 throughan, if all true, imply b.
The atomb is called theheadthe clause, and the atoms
a1, . . . , an the bodyof the clause. An atom is usually
used to state a fact. An atom is formed from a predicate
symbol followed by a parenthesized list of variables and
constants. We can express the fact “Bob is in Hanover”
aslocation(Bob,Hanover), for example.
Example authorization rules. The teams respond-
ing to a large-scale disaster are coordinated by experts
drawn from multiple disciplines (fire, police, medical)
and often multiple jurisdictions (city, state, federal). In-
creasingly, incident commanders use software to assist
with incident management and situational awareness.
The National Incident Management System [7] defines
clear roles for the many participants in a large-scale re-
sponse, so role-based access control (RBAC) [12] is a
natural basis for protecting resources in an incident man-
agement system (IMS). Such an IMS needs to dynami-
cally link people, resources, and information from mul-
tiple domains, providing information to those who need
it in a time of crisis.
Suppose that an incident occurs in an airport. There is
a surveillance camera image server managed by the air-
port, and the chief of operations (bob) wishes to use the
camera images to improve his awareness of the situation.
Figure2 shows a set of rules that define the airport’s pol-
icy to grant access to the camera resource, which allows
the local police chief access to the images whenever he
is in the airport, as determined by either his Wi-Fi net-
work connection or by the GPS tracking device in his
radio. Rule 1 says that principalP must hold the role
operationchief to be granted, and rule 2 defines the two
conditions to hold that role. The first condition specifies
the prerequisite rolepolice chief in a police department,
and the second requires principalP to be in the airport.
Rules 3–5 specify how we derive the location of princi-
palP from the raw location information of a device.
2.2 Proof tree
To make an authorization decision, we must check
whether a proof tree for query?grant(P ) can be con-
structed or not with a given set of rules and facts. The
Rules:
grant(P ) ← role(P, operationchief) (1)
role(P, operationchief) ← roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport) (2)
location(P,L) ← owner(P,D) ∧ location(D,L) (3)
location(D,L) ← wifi(D,A) ∧ in(A,L) (4)
location(D,L) ← gps(D,X, Y ) ∧ closeTo(X, Y, L) (5)
Facts:
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept). Bob is chief of the local police department. (6)
owner(bob, pda15) Bob owns device pda15 (7)
wifi(pda15, ap39). pda15 is associated with access point ap39. (8)
in(ap39, airport). Access point ap39 is at the airport. (9)
Figure 2. Sample set of rules. We use uppercase for variables and lowercase for constants
and names.
proof tree consists of nodes that represent rules (or facts)
and edges that represent the unification of the atom in
the body of the rule in a parent node with the head of the
rule in a child node. Every leaf node contains a fact that
has no atom in its body.
Given the facts listed in Figure2, we can construct
the proof tree shown in Figure3 by unifying the query
with the first four rules, substituting variables as needed.
We return to this example in Section4.6 to explain how
we construct this proof in a distributed fashion.
3 Security policies
Each principal definesconfidentiality policiesto pro-
tect information in its knowledge base. It also defines
integrity policiesto specify whether it believes that eval-
uation results or rules received from other principals are
correct.
3.1 Rule patterns
We first introduce the notion ofrule patterns, which
are mechanisms for expressing these security policies
in our security model. A rule pattern is just a reg-
ular Horn clause to be unified with a rule or a fact
in the knowledge base. A rule pattern is used to
define a policy for any rules or facts that match it
through unification, a pattern-matching process that
makes a rule pattern and an actual rule in the knowl-
edge base identical by instantiating variables in the rule
pattern. For example, the rule patternlocation(bob,X)
is matched with the factlocation(bob, hanover) in
the knowledge base, because the variableX can be
instantiated tohanover. It does not match with
the fact location(alice, hanover), however. The
rule pattern role(X, Y ) ← occupation(X, Y ) ∧
location(X, hospital) can be matched with the rule
role(P, physician) ← occupation(P, physician) ∧
location(P, hospital) by instantiatingX to P and Y
to physician.
A principal may define as many security policies as it
chooses. Each security policy(rp, t) is represented as a
rule patternrp and a set of trusted principalst.
3.2 Integrity policies
Integrity policies express trust in the correctness of
rules and facts. When a principalpi defines the integrity
policy (rp, t) it means thatpi trusts those principals int,
which we often denotetrusti(rp), to be correct in what-
ever rules or facts match patternrp. We use subscripti
in the trust policy to denote which principal defines the
policy.
The integrity of a fact means that the boolean value
representing a fact is correct. For example, if princi-
pal p0 includes principalp1 in its trust0(loc(P,X)),
then principalp0 believes thatp1’s evaluation (true or
false) of a location query of the form?loc(P,X) (e.g.,
?loc(bob, hanover)) is correct. On the other hand,
the integrity of a rule means that the rule itself is
able to correctly derive a new fact. For example, if
principal p0 includes principalp1 in its rule pattern,
trust0(loc(P,X)←WiFi(P, Y )∧ in(Y,X)), thenp0
believes thatp1’s rule loc(bob,X) ← WiFi(bob, Y ) ∧
in(Y,X) is a correct rule to resolve the query of
the form ?loc(bob, hanover). In other words, prin-
PSfrag replacements
?grant(bob)
grant(bob)← role(bob, operation chief)
role(bob, operation chief)← roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(bob, airport)
location(bob, airport)← owner(bob, pda15) ∧ location(pda15, airport)
location(pda15, airport)← wifi(pda15, ap39) ∧ in(ap39, airport)
location(D,L)← gps(D,X, Y ) ∧ closeTo(X,Y, L)
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)
owner(bob, pda15)
wifi(pda15, ap39) in(ap39, airport)
Figure 3. Example proof tree based on the rules in Figure 2.
cipal p0 believes that the queryloc(bob, hanover)
is replaced with two sub-queries?WiFi(bob, Y ) and
?in(Y, hanover). Principalp0 can verify that principal
p1 applied the rule correctly to derive the conclusion by
checking the proof tree as we describe in Section2.2.
Notice that trust on a fact is a stronger notion than
trust on a rule. Trust on a fact implicitly trusts the rules
used to derive that fact. For example, the trust on the
rule patternloc(X, Y ) implicitly indicates trust of any
rule whose head can be unified withloc(X, Y ).
3.3 Confidentiality policies
Confidentiality policies protect facts and rules in a
principal’s knowledge base. A fact must be protected if
it contains confidential information. A rule must be pro-
tected if confidential information may be inferred from
reading the rule. For example, the rulegrant(P ) ←
loc(bob, sudikoff) says that any principalP is granted
access whenbob is at the location ofsudikoff building.
If a request is granted, the requester may infer that bob
is at Sudikoff, which might not be public knowledge.
When a principalpi defines the confidentiality pol-
icy (rp, t), it means thatpi trusts those principals in
t, which we often refer to as the access control list
acli(rp), with facts or rules matching rule patternp.
Principalp0 only responds to a queryq from principal
p1 if there exists a rule patternrp that can be unified
with the queryq and principalp1 belongs toacl0(rp).
For example, suppose that principalp0 defines the pol-
icy acl0(location(bob, L)) = {p1, p2}; principalp0 re-
sponds to a query?location(bob, hanover) from prin-
cipal p1, because rule patternlocation(bob, L) matches
with location(bob, hanover).
4 Authorization on the basic security
model
In this section, we describes our authorization sys-
tem for the simpler case, where policies apply only to
facts. We make a few assumptions to maintain our
focus on the confidentiality and integrity issues in dis-
tributed context-sensitive authorization systems. First,
the integrity policies of each principal are public knowl-
edge. Second, a public-key infrastructure is available
and every principal can obtain the public key of other
participants, so that they can establish secure channels
with a session key and verify the authenticity of mes-
sages with digital signatures.
4.1 Architecture
With no central server to make authorization deci-
sions, we use multiple hosts that are administered by dif-
ferent principals. Without loss of generality, we assume
that each hosti is administered by a different principal
pi, although in many realistic environments there may
be principals that own or manage many hosts. Each host
stores a local copy of its principal’s integrity and confi-
dentiality policies. Each host provides an interface for
handling queries from remote hosts, and may ask other














Figure 4. Architectural overview. The
hosts enclosed in the dotted lines make


















Figure 5. Structure of a host.
a user sends a request to the server that provides some
service, and the server issues an authorization query to a
host it chooses in order to make a granting decision.
The structure of a host is shown in Figure5. The
query handler handles queries from other hosts and en-
forces the local confidentiality policies. The inference
engine constructs a proof tree for a given query based
on the rules and facts in the local knowledge base. If
some query cannot be evaluated locally, the inference
engine issues a remote query to another host through the
query issuer. The query issuer refers to its local integrity
policies to choose a principal whose evaluation of the
query is trusted; the integrity policies serve as a direc-
tory service to choose a principal to which it sends a
query. The query issuer receives a response and checks
its integrity based on the integrity policies. The event
handler converts events that contain new context infor-
mation into corresponding facts and updates the knowl-
edge base; these events may be delivered by a context-
dissemination service such as SOLAR [3].
4.2 Proof object
The response to a query is aproof object represented
as(pr, n, (value)Kr ), wherepr is a receiver principal.
The proof object contains a noncen that is attached with
the query to prevent replay attacks by an adversary that
is capable of intercepting the encrypted messages be-
tween principals. We omit the field of a noncen in the
proof object for brevity in the following discussion. The
value is a query result, which is a boolean value (TRUE
or FALSE), a conjunction of boolean values, or the value
REJECT. The valueREJECTis used when a given query
is not handled because the querier principal does not sat-
isfy the handler principal’s confidentiality policies. Oth-
erwise, the handler principal constructs a proof tree lo-
cally, then includes the query’s result (TRUEor FALSE)
in the proof object. (We name the returned object a
proof objectbecause, in the extended model, it contains
a proof tree that shows how the query result is derived.)
The receiver principalpr might not be the principal that
issues queryq (we explain why, below), and, therefore,
the name of the receiver principal needs to be included
in the proof object, so that the receiver principal can de-
crypt an encrypted value. The value must be encrypted
with receiver principalpr ’s public keyKr to enforce the
confidentiality policies of the publisher principal.
A principalp0 that handles queryq0 might issue sub-
queries to other principals, and the returned proofs from
those principals might contain encrypted query results
that principalp0 cannot decrypt. Therefore, the query
q0’s result depends on the encrypted values in the proofs
for the subqueries thatp0 issues, and principalp0 re-
turns a proof for queryq0 that contains the query re-
sults for the subqueries as follows. Suppose that prin-
cipal p0 issues subqueriesqi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1,
and receives severalpfi = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)) where
pr(i) is the receiver principal of the proof,valuei is
the queryqi’s result, andKr(i) is principalpr(i)’s pub-
lic key. The queryq0’s result is TRUE only if p0
can verify thatvaluei is TRUE for all i in the proof.
If any pfr(i) (for which r(i) = 0) is FALSE, p0 re-
turns a simple proof(pr, (FALSE)Kr ). Otherwise, if
there are some subproofs thatp0 cannot decrypt (be-
causer(i) 6= 0), then principalp0 returns the proof
(pr, (Πi(pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)))Kr ) for all r(i) 6= 0, as
a response to queryq0. The proof contains the con-
catenated subproofs encrypted with public keyKr. The
query result of the proof isTRUE if the conjunction of
all thevaluei (i.e.,∧i(valuei)) is TRUE.
4.3 Decomposition of a proof tree
When a querier issues a query to a principal that the
















Figure 6. Decomposed proof tree. Princi-
pals p0, p1, and p2 construct a proof tree
for query q0 in a distributed way. Nodes n0
and n1 are leaf nodes of proof trees T0 and
T1 respectively. Principal p0 that handles
query q0 issues query q1 to principal p1 to
obtain the fact in node n0, and principal p1
similarly issues query q2 to principal p2.
the principal that handles the query only returns a proof
that contains the query’s result (TRUE, FALSE, or RE-
JECT), and the proof tree that derives the query’s result
does not have to be disclosed to the querier. If multi-
ple principals are involved in processing a query, no sin-
gle principal obtains all the rules and facts in the proof
tree of the original query. Instead, the proof tree for the
query is decomposed into multiplesubtreesevaluated by
different principals in a distributed environment.
Figure6 shows that the proof tree for queryq0 is con-
structed by principalp0, p1, andp2 in a distributed way.
Principalp0 receives queryq0 and issues subqueryq1
to principalp1 to construct a proof treeT0, and principal
p1 similarly issues queryq2 to principalp2 to construct a
proof treeT1. The facts or rules in the proof treesT0, T1,
andT2 are not disclosed to other principals; the result of
evaluating each proof tree is returned to the querier as a
boolean value or conjunction of encrypted boolean val-
ues.
Example. Figure 7 shows the proofs in the eval-
uation of the query?grant(bob), involving p1, p2
and p3. The query ?grant(bob) from princi-
Security policies
Knowledge base Knowledge base







rule1 ≡ grant(P )← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)
(p0, TRUE)
(p1, TRUE) (p1, TRUE)
?grant(bob)
?role(bob, doctor) ?location(bob, hospital)
role(bob, doctor) location(bob, hospital)
trust(grant(P )) = {p1}
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2}
trust(location(P,L)) = {p3}
Figure 7. Example of distributed query pro-
cessing. The solid arrows are labeled with
queries and the dashed arrows are labeled
with returned proofs. The rounded rectan-
gles with dotted lines represent the knowl-
edge bases and security policies of those
principals respectively. The definition of
rule1 is enclosed in the rectangle at the
bottom of the figure.
pal p0 to p1 is decomposed into two sub-queries
?role(bob, doctor) and ?location(bob, hospital) ac-
cording to the rule rule1 ≡ grant(X) ←
role(X, doctor) ∧ location(X, hospital), and those
subqueries are handled by principalp2 and p3 re-
spectively. Principal p2 has the matching fact
role(bob, doctor) in its knowledge base and returns the
proof (p1, TRUE) to principal p1. Principal p3 also
returns the proof(p1, TRUE). Principalp1 trusts the
integrity of the proofs fromp2 andp3 according to its
integrity policies, and internally constructs the proof
tree that contains the rulerule1 as a root node and
the factsrole(bob, doctor) andlocation(bob, hospital)
as its children nodes. Principalp1 concludes that
the statementgrant(bob) is true and returns the proof
(p0, TRUE).
4.4 Enforcement of confidentiality policies
The enforcement of each principal’s confidentiality
policies is different from that in many existing authoriza-
tion systems, which check the privileges of a requester
principal before divulging information directly to the re-
quester. In our system, a principal that publishes a proof
chooses the receiver of the proof from a list of upstream
principals in the whole proof tree. The principal may
make that choice because its confidentiality policy does
not allow it to divulge the information to the querier,
but may allow the information to be released to another
principal further up the tree. The encrypted result will
become part of the querier’s proof/response up the tree;
eventually the receiver principal may decrypt the result
and compute the conjunction to see whether the tree is
true.
We formally define the ordered list of upstream prin-
cipals as follows. We say that a principalrepresentsa
proof-tree node when a rule or a fact contained in that
node is published by that principal. We denote the prin-
cipal that represents noden asrep(n), and the ordered
list of principals that represent a corresponding ordered
list of nodess asrep(s). Suppose that principalp rep-
resents a noden in a proof tree. We denote the ordered
list of nodes on the path from the root of the proof tree
to n, excludingn, asupstream nodes(n). That is, the
nodes are ordered from the root node downward.
The list of upstream principals forp is defined
as rep(upstream nodes(n)), which we denote as
receivers(p). In Figure8, principalp0’s issuing query
q0 causes principalsp1 and p2 to issue subqueries
q1, q2 and q3. Principal p3’s list receivers(p3) is
< p0, p1, p2 >, for example.
When a publisher principal chooses a receiver from
the list receivers(p), the receiver must satisfy the fol-
lowing two conditions. First, it must satisfy the pub-
lisher’s confidentiality policies. For example, suppose
that principalp4 choosesp1 as the receiver of queryq3’s
result. Principalp1 must satisfyp4’s confidentiality poli-
cies for queryq3; that is,p4 must have confidentiality
policy (rp, t) where rule patternrp matches queryq3
and principalp1 belongs to a set of principalst.
Second, the receiver principal must satisfy the con-
straints due to recursive encryption of a proof at each
principal. A principal that handles a query might is-
sue subqueries to other principals. If that principal can-
not decrypt the query results in those subproofs, it in-
cludes the subproofs into its proof and encrypts them
with the public key of a receiver principal. This recur-
sive encryption is necessary to prevent a untrusted inter-
mediate principal on the path towards the receiver from
knowing the query result by decrypting some subproof
whose query result isFALSE. Because such embedded
encrypted subproofs are encrypted recursively by inter-
mediate principals until they reach their receiving princi-
pals, the intermediate principals have to make sure that
their encryption on embedded subproofs are decrypted
when the proof reaches the receiving principals of the
subproofs. Otherwise, the embedded subproofs pass the
receiving principals without being decrypted, and the
proof fails.
In Figure8, principalp3 choosesp0 as the receiver
of proof pf3 ≡ (p0, (value3)K0) wherevalue3 is query
q2’s result andK0 is p0’s public key, andp4 choosesp1
as the receiver of proofpf4. Principalp2 embeds those
proofs fromp3 andp4 into proof pf2, becausep2 can-
not decrypt those proofs. Suppose that both principalp0
andp1 in receivers(p2) satisfy the first condition; they
satisfyp2’s confidentiality policies for queryq1. Princi-
pal p2 must choosep1 as the receiver to satisfy the sec-
ond condition. Because principalp1 decrypts and eval-
uates the proofpf4, p1 only embedspf3 into proof pf1,
which is decrypted by principalp0, if the evaluation of
pf4 is TRUE. (Otherwise,p2 drops the proofpf3 and re-
turn a proof that contains aFALSEvalue.) If principal
p2 choosesp0 as the receiver of proofpf2 instead, the
proof pf4, which is embedded in proofpf2, is forwarded
to p0 without being decrypted byp1 and the proof is not
usable byp0.
In general, a proof contains any number of encrypted
subproofs. Suppose that principali’s list receivers(pi)
is < p0, . . . , pi−1 >, andpi returns proofpfi that con-
tains subproofspfj for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 to principal
pk. Let pr(j) be the receiver principal for proofpfj , and
index(p, s) be the function that returnsp’s index in the
ordered lists. The second condition for selecting a re-
ceiver is stated as follows.
∀j ((index(pr(j), receivers(pi))
≤ index(pk, receivers(pi))) ∨ (r(j) = i))
If there is more than one principal that satisfies the above
two conditions, principalpk chooses the principal of the
minimum index (closest to the root). This guideline
is important not to narrow the choices of the receivers
made by the upstream principals. Note that the proof
fails if the path to the root does not permit these decryp-
tions and validations; the failure results because the in-
tegrity and confidentiality policies of the principals in-
volved will not allow the necessary information sharing.
4.5 Algorithm
Each host (run by some principal) provides an in-
terfaceHANDLEREMOTEQUERY for handling a query
from a remote host. It takes as parameters a query
string q, a list of upstream principalsreceiversdefined
in Section4.4, and a querier principal’s integrity poli-
ciesi policies. The functionHANDLEREMOTEQUERY
calls the functionGENERATEPROOF to obtain a proof.
Figure9 shows the algorithm for the functionGEN-
ERATEPROOF, run onp1’s host to build a proof while en-

















Figure 8. Enforcement of confidentiality policies. Principal p0’s query q0 is handled by principals
p1, p2, p3, and p4 in a distributed way. Principal pi handles query qi−1, and returns the proof pfi,
for i = 1 to 4.
The function takes several parameters: principalp0 that
issues a query, principalp1 that handles a query, a query
string q, a list of upstream principalsreceivers for p1
(i.e.,receivers(p1)), p0’s integrity policiesi policies0,
p1’s integrity policiesi policies1, p1’s confidentiality
policiesc policies1, andp1’s knowledge baseKB1.
Line 2 checks whether there is any principal in the list
receivers that satisfies the handler principalp1’s con-
fidentiality policies. The principals that belong to the
intersection ofreceivers and the union of the access-
control lists inp1’s confidentiality policies for queryq
are eligible to receive a proof fromp1. We treat the or-
dered listreceivers as a set in line 2, and denote the
result set as. If there is no such principal (i.e., the set
s is empty), line 4 returns a proof with aREJECTvalue
to querier principalp0.
Line 5 sets the receiver principal of a proof in the case
that the query result in the proof is obtained locally. The
chosen receiver is that principal that belongs to lists and
has the minimum index in the ordered listreceivers.
We choose that principal withminIndex(s, receivers)
in line 5.
Line 7 checks whether the handler principal1 satis-
fies the querierp0’s integrity policies (we use the symbol
‘ |’ to denote “such as” in our algorithm for brevity). If
not, line 8 returns a proof with aFALSEvalue to princi-
palpr. Line 9 checks whether queryq matches factf in
p1’s knowledge base. If so, line 10 returns a proof with
aTRUEvalue to principalpr.
Lines 11–19 cover the case that queryq matches the
head of ruler in p1’s knowledge base. Line 12 uni-
fies queryq and ruler ≡ A ← B1, . . . , Bn, resulting
in the instantiated ruleA’ ← B1’ , . . . , Bn’. Lines 13–
14 obtain subproofs for the subqueriesB1’ , . . . , Bn’ it-
eratively. If principalp1 can decrypt all the values in
the subproofs, and all the subproofs contain aTRUE
value, then line 16 returns a proof with aTRUE value
to principalpr. Line 17 checks whether the subproofs
decrypted byp0 contain aTRUEvalue, and if so, line 18
checks whether there is some principalpr′ that satis-
fies the constraint due to the recursive encryption we de-
scribe in Section4.4; that is,pr′ ’s index in the ordered
list receivers must be greater than or equal to the in-
dex ofpr(i) in receivers if r(i) 6= 1. If there is such a
principalpr′ , line 19 returns a proof containing the sub-
proofs whose values could not be decrypted byp1 with
principalpr′ as the recipient.
When lines 7–19 fail to construct a proof that de-
rives queryq, our algorithm does not return a proof
that containsFALSE immediately. Instead, it tries to
obtain a proof from a remote principal in lines 21–25.
Line 21 checks whether there is any principall that
satisfiesp1’s integrity policies for queryq. If that holds
true, line 22 appendsp1 into the ordered listreceivers,
and line 23 calls the functionISSUEREMOTEQUERY.
Line 24 returns the returned proof. If line 21 fails to
find such a principalpl, then line 25 returns a proof with
aFALSEvalue.
4.6 Example application
Consider again our initial example of an incident
management system (IMS) shown in Figure2; a cen-
tralized server would produce the proof tree in Figure3.
Figure 10 shows how userbob (principal p0) requests
images from the surveillance camera image server man-
aged by the airport (principalp1). Bob’s request is
handled by multiple principalsp1, p2, . . . , p7. In Fig-
ure 10, every principal issues queries to the principals
that satisfy its integrity policies, and every querier ex-
cept for principalp2 satisfies the confidentiality policies
of the principals to which it sends the queries. Princi-
pal p2 does not satisfyp4’s confidentiality policies for
query?location(bob, airport), becausep2 is temporar-
ily assigned to manage the role server for the incident,
and thus principalp4 does not establish a long-term trust
relation with principalp2. Fortunately,p1 that runs the
surveillance camera image server satisfiesp4’ confiden-
GENERATEPROOF(p0, p1, q, receivers, i policies0, i policies1, c policies1,KB1)
1  Check whether there is any principal inreceivers that satisfiesp1’s confidentiality policies
2 s← receivers ∩ (
⋃
i ti) for all policies(rpi, ti) ∈ c policies1 whererpi matchesq
3 if s = ∅ if sets is empty.
4 then return (p0, (REJECT)K0)
5 pr ← minIndex(s, receivers)
6  Check whether principalp1 satisfies querierp0’s integrity policies
7 if ¬(∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policies0) ∧ (rp matchesq) ∧ (p1 ∈ t)))
8 then return (pr, (FALSE)Kr )
9 if ∃ factf | ((f ∈ KB1) ∧ (f matchesq))
10 then return (pr, (TRUE)Kr )
11 elseif∃ rule r ≡ A← B1, . . . , Bn | ((r ∈ KB1) ∧ (A matchesq))
12 then unify q andA← B1, . . . , Bn, resulting inA’ ← B1’ , . . . , Bn’
13 for i← 1 to n
14 do pfi ← GENERATEPROOF(p1, p1, Bi’ , receivers, i policies1, i policies1, c policies1,KB1)
wherepfi = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)), andr(i) is a receiver principal ofpfi
15 if ∀i ((pfi = (p1, (valuei)K1)) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))
16 then return (pr, (TRUE)Kr )
17 elseif∀i ((pfi = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i))) ∧ (((r(i) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))))
18 then if ∃ pr′ | (∀i (((pr′ ∈ s) ∧ (index(pr(i), receivers) ≤ index(pr′ , receivers)) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1))
∨(r(i) = 1)))
19 then return (pr′ , (Πi pfi)Kr′ )
for all i wherepfi = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1)
20  If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally, we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
21 if ∃ principalpl (∃ policy p = (rp, t) ((p ∈ i policies1) ∧ (rp matchesq) ∧ (pl ∈ t)))
22 then appendp1 to receivers
23 proof← ISSUEREMOTEQUERY(pl, q, receivers, i policies1)
24 return proof
25 else return (pr, (FALSE)Kr )
Figure 9. Algorithm for generating a proof.
tiality policies, principalp4 encrypts the query result
with p1’s public key, and principalp2 embedsp4’s proof
into its own proof, and returns it top1. Principalp1 de-
crypts the query result in the proof fromp2, but it is not
aware of the fact that the query result is created by prin-
cipalp4.
5 Authorization on the extended security
model
In this section, we describe how we extend the au-
thorization system for the basic model in Section4 to
support security policies on rules. Due to the page lim-
itation, we cover the major features to be added briefly.
See our technical report [10] for its complete descrip-
tion.
Even if the result of evaluating a local proof tree is
true, the result returned to a proof that contains a proof
tree instead of simply the resultTRUE. This would hap-
pen when the querier principal does not trust the in-
tegrity of the query result from the handler principal,
but trusts the handler’s rule that is used to decompose
the query into subqueries. When the querier receives a
proof object, it checks the integrity of its proof tree by
checking the integrity of all the nodes published by dif-
ferent principals.
The evaluation of a proof tree is performed by
the principals whose query results are trusted by their
queriers. If there are multiple such principals participat-
ing in evaluating an authorization query, the whole proof
tree is decomposed into several subtrees and is evaluated
by those principals in a distributed way. We enforce con-
fidentiality policies as we describe in Section4.4, except
that a receiver principal must be an upstream principal
that evaluates a proof subtree. Again, our report [10]
has the details.
6 Related work
Although others have developed context-sensitive au-
thorization systems, they all use a trusted central context
server that collects context information, and they do not
address the protection of context information used in au-
thorization rules or facts. Cerberus [1] allows principals
to define context-sensitive policies based on first-order
logic. It expresses context information with context
predicates such as “Location” and “Temperature”, sim-
ilar to our approach. Cerberus has a monolithic context
infrastructure that contains current and historical context
information, and a single inference engine evaluates all
the authorization decisions. Generalized RBAC (GR-
BAC) [4, 5] introduces the environmental role (ERole)
to achieve context-aware authorization. Their approach
is based on the concept of Role-based access-control
(RBAC). Constraints on environmental (context) vari-
ables can be defined with a Prolog-like logic language.
Authorization is based on an ordinary role and an ERole;
in effect, the ERole is an additional condition to be sat-
isfied for an authorization decision. GRBAC has a cen-
tral context management service that maintains a snap-
shot of current environmental conditions. OASIS [2, 6]
is an RBAC system that can evaluate contextual condi-
tions at both role-activation time and access time. The
context conditions are expressed as context predicates in
the Horn clauses of role-activation rules. OASIS has a
centralized object-relational database that stores context
predicates. Myles [11] provides a XML-based autho-
rization language for defining privacy policies that pro-
tect users’ location information. Users must trust a set
of validators that collect context information and make
authorization decisions.
SD3 [8] is an inference engine for a trust management
system that constructs a proof tree for a given query so
that the querier can verify the correctness of the query
result. Its focus is to retrieve certificates (that corre-
spond to facts in a knowledge base) from remote hosts
automatically, and a whole proof tree is constructed on a
central server. Therefore, all the remote hosts must trust
the central server to preserve the confidentiality policies
of their facts.
The idea of delegating the evaluation of a proof to a
trusted server also appears in some protocols used to ver-
ify a certificate in a public-key infrastructure. To verify
a certificate, one must construct a certificate chain from
the certificate authority (CA) that issued the certificate
to a CA that is trusted by a querier. The Simple Cer-
tificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [9] allows a client
with limited processing and communication capabilities
to ask a trusted server about the validity of a certificate.
The client can specify a list of trusted CAs in its valida-
tion policy to be observed by the server. The client can
ask the server to provide additional information, such
as a certification path and corresponding revocation sta-
tus, depending on the trustworthiness of the server. Al-
though it is similar to our work in the sense that the
protocol uses the client’s trust in the server to split the
overhead of verifying a certificate between them, it is
specialized in handling certificate chains, and it does not
support general rules. In addition, there is no mechanism
that addresses the confidentiality of rules or facts, be-
cause cross certificates (trust relations) among CAs are
considered to be public knowledge.
7 Discussion
Our authorization scheme ensures that each princi-









?role(bob, police chief, police dept) ?location(bob, airport)
?owner(bob, pda15) ?location(pda15, L)
?wifi(pda15, ap39)
(p1, (p1, (TRUE)K1))
(p2, (TRUE)K2) (p1, (TRUE)K1)
(p4, (TRUE)K4) (p4, (TRUE)K4)
(p6, (TRUE)K6)
grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief)
role(P, operation chief) ← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
location(P,L) ← owner(P,D) ∧ location(D,L)
location(D,L) ← in(A,L) ∧ wifi(D,A)










Figure 10. Example of an emergency response system. Principal p0 is a first responder whose
role is “operation chief”. Principal p1 represents a surveillance camera image server. Principal
p2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS). Principal p3 is the
role membership server of a police department. Principal p4 represents a location-tracking
service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals. Each arrow is labeled
with a query and a returned proof. The query is shown above the dashed line; the proof is
shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and confidentiality policies are shown in a
dashed rectangle.
ipating in the evaluation of an authorization query. A
malicious principal that represents an internal node of
a proof subtree cannot obtain a rule or a fact from other
principals by modifying thereceiverslist in a subquery it
issues, because each principal discloses its rules or facts
to other principals only if they satisfy its confidentiality
policies as described in Section4.
The malicious principal could also modify the in-
tegrity policies i policies in a subquery to disturb the
evaluation of a query. This attack can be prevented if
every principal publishes its integrity policies with its
digital signature on a well-known server, and each prin-
cipal can cache other principal’s integrity policies. The
i policiesin a query can then be retrieved by identifying
the principal specified by the last index of thereceivers
list.
Although it seems difficult for each principal to de-
fine confidentiality and integrity policies for rules and
facts, it is possible for a principal to refer to the policies
of other principals to reduce the administrative work for
defining policies. For example, principalp0 could define
a meta-rule that says “if principalp1 trusts the integrity
of the evaluation of a queryq by principalp2, thenp0
trustsq in the same way.”
8 Current status and future work
Our current prototype system is implemented in Java,
by extending XProlog [13] with a feature to construct a
proof for a query instead of simply evaluating the query
and returning a result. We plan to deploy our current im-
plementation in realistic large-scale applications and to
evaluate the performance and scalability of our system.
9 Summary
We describe a secure context-sensitive authorization
system that supports the decentralized construction and
evaluation of authorization decisions, involving multiple
principals from different administrative domains, and re-
spects the confidentiality and integrity policies of each
principal involved.
We define our security model based on the notion of
rule patternsthat allow each principal to define confi-
dentiality and integrity policies on the rules and facts in
its knowledge base. Because our system evaluates an
authorization query on multiple hosts run by different
principals in a distributed way, it is possible for each
principal to choose to which principal it is willing to
disclose the information needed to evaluate the autho-
rization query.
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